Introduction
This paper presents series on top incomes and top wages in India between the years 1922 and 2000 based on individual tax returns data. We use tabulations of tax returns published each year by the Indian tax administration to compute the share of the top percentile of the distribution of total income, the top 0,5%, the top 0,1% and the top 0,01%. We do the same for the wage distribution. We do not go below the top percentile because incomes below this level are largely exempt from taxation in India.
Our series begin in 1922, when the income tax was ceated in India, and allow us to look at the impact of the Great Depression and World War 2 on inequality. We are particularly interested in the period starting in the 1950s, right at the beginning of India's experiment with socialism. This experiment was officially suspended in 1991 with the beginning of the liberalization process, which continued through the 1990s. One explicit goal of the socialist program was to limit the economic power of the elite, in the context of a mixed economy. Our data offers us the opportunity to say something about the extent to which this program, with all its well-known deficiencies, succeeded in its distributional objectives. This is important first, because it is an important part of our assessment of this period. And second, because it offers a window into the broader question of the role of policy in affecting the distribution of income and wealth in a developing country. Given that much of the economic activity in these countries is outside the formal sector, it is not at all obvious that there is a lot that policy can affect.
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Our results are consistent with an important role for policy in shaping the distribution of income. In particular, we do find evidence of a substantial decline in the share of the elite during the years of socialist planning and a comparable recovery in the post-liberalization era. However the rebound seems to start significantly before the official move towards liberalization.
Given that these results are likely to be controversial, it is worth emphasizing that there are a number of obvious problems with using tax data, not the least because of tax evasion. We discuss these at some length in section 4. While we conclude that our results are probably robust, we do not intend them to be definitive. Our view is rather that 1 Especially tax policy. they provide a point of departure on an important question about which very little is known, primarily because of data limitations. There are good reasons to suspect that the usual sources of information on income distribution in India---such as consumer expenditure surveys---are not particularly effective at picking up the very rich. This is in part because the rich are rare, and in part because they are much more likely to refuse to cooperate with the time-consuming and irksome process of being subjected to a consumer expenditure survey. 2 While there is no hard evidence that the rich are indeed being undercounted in India, (the Indian consumer expenditure surveys do not, for example, report refusal rates by potential income category), one reason to suspect that this the case comes from what has been called the Indian growth paradox of the 1990s. According to the standard household expenditure survey conducted by the National Sample Survey (NSS), real per capita growth in India during the 1990s was fairly limited. Such a conclusion stands in sharp contrast with the substantial growth measured by national accounts statistics (NAS) over this same period. This puzzle has attracted quite a lot of attention during the recent years 3 and it has been widely suggested that it might simply be that a very large part of the growth went to very rich. However there has been no attempt to directly quantify this possibility. 4 Our data allows us to take a useful step in this direction. We are able to put bounds on the extent to which the growth gap can be explained simply in terms of undercounting the very rich. We conclude that it can explain between 20% and 40% of the puzzle. Although this is not negligible, this leaves the bulk of the puzzle unaccounted 2 See, e.g., Szekely and Hilgert (1999) , who look at a large number of Latin American household surveys and find that the 10 largest incomes reported in surveys are often not very much larger than the salary of an average manager in the given country at the time of survey. For a systematic comparison of survey and national accounts aggregates in developing countries, see Ravallion (2001) . 3 See, e.g., Datt (1999) , Ravallion (2000) , The World Bank (2000), Sundaram and Tendulkar (2001) . Recently released data from the 1999-2000 NSS round has revealed that NSS growth was larger than expected during the 1990s and that poverty rates did decline over this period, contrarily to what most observers believed on the basis of pre-1999-2000 NSS rounds (see Deaton and Dreze (2002) and Deaton (2003a Deaton ( , 2003b ). However the overall NSS-NAS growth gap still appears to be substantial, even after this correction (see Table 2 below), and this substantial gap remains to be explained. The existence of a discrepency between NSS and NAS statistics was already a subject of inquiry in India during the 1980s (see e.g. Minhas (1988) and Minhas and Kansal (1990) ), but the gap observed during the 1990s appears to be substantially larger than during previous decades. For a broader, international perspective on the survey vs. national accounts debate, see Deaton (2003c) .
for, largely because the share of the rich in total income is still relatively small. This suggests that there probably is some deeper problem with the way either the NSS or the NSO (which generates the NAS) collects its data.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines our data and methodology. Section 3 presents our long run results. Section 4 discusses potential problems with this evidence. Section 5 uses this evidence to shed some light on the Indian growth paradox of the 1990s. Section 6 concludes.
Data and methodology
The tabulations of tax returns published each year by the Indian tax administration in the "All-India Income-Tax Statistics" (AIITS) series constitute the primary data source used in this paper. The first year for which we have income data is 1922-1923 while the last is 1999-2000. 6 Due to the relatively high exemption levels, the number of taxpayers in India has always been rather small. The proportion of taxable tax units was around 0,5%-1% from the 1920s to the 1980s, and it rose sharply during the 1990s up to 3,5%-4% at the end of the decade, following the large increase in top nominal incomes (see figure 1 ). 7 Therefore our long run series cannot go below the top percentile.
5 See Bhalla (2002) for a negative view of the NSS approach. For more balanced discussions of the relative merits of survey and national accounts aggregates in developing countries, see Ravallion (2001) and Deaton (2003c) . 6 All references to the relevant AIITS publications are given in the working paper version (see Banerjee and Piketty (2004, . Note also that AIITS publications always refer to assessment years (AY), i.e. years during which incomes are assessed, while we always refer to income years (IY) (IY=AY-1). For instance, AIITS 1923-4 contains the data on IY 1922-3, etc., and AIITS 1999-00 contains the data on IY 1998-9. AIITS 2000-01 (IY 1999-00) was not yet available when we revised this paper, and our IY 1999-0 figures for top incomes were obtained by inflating the 1998-9 figures by the nominal 1999-00/1998-9 per tax unit national income growth rate. This approximation probably leads us to under-estimate top income growth. We did this because there was no large NSS round for 1998-9 so it was easier to make comparison with 1999-00 as the end point. 7 Throughout the paper, "tax units" should be thought of as individuals (all of our estimates have been obtained by summing up tax returns filed by individuals and those filed by "Hindu undivided families" (HUF); the latter make less than 5% of the total in the 1990s, down from about 20% in the interwar). The total, theoretical number of tax units was set to be equal to 40% of the total population of India throughout the period (see Banerjee and Piketty (2004, Table A1, col. (2)) ). This represents a rough estimate of the Insert Figure 1 : The proportion of taxable tax units in India, 1922 India, -2000 The tabulations published in AIITS report the number of taxpayers and the total income reported by these taxpayers for a large number of income brackets. By using standard Pareto extrapolation techniques we computed for each year the average incomes of the top percentile (P99-100), the top 0,5% (P99,5-100), the top 0,1% (P99,9-100) and the top 0,01% (P99,99-100) of the tax unit distribution of total income, as well as the income thresholds P99, P99,5, P99,9 and P99,99 and the average incomes of the intermediate fractiles P99-99,5, P99,5-99,9 and P99,9-99,99. 8 To get a sense of the orders of magnitude, we report in table 1 the results obtained for 1999-00. There were almost 400 millions tax units in India in 1999-00 (396.4 millions).
Based on the national accounts statistics, the average income of those 400 millions tax units was around Rs. 25,000 per year ($3,000 in PPP terms).
9 To belong to the top percentile (P99), which includes about 4 million tax units, one needed to make more than Rs.88,000 (around $10,000 at PPP). The average income of the bottom half of the top percentile (fractile P99-99,5, about 2 million tax units) was about Rs. 99,000 (less than $12,000 at PPP). To belong to the top 0.01% (about 40,000 tax units), one needs to make more than Rs.1.4 million ($160,000 at PPP), and the average income above that threshold was more than Rs. 4 million ($470,000 at PPP).
10 potential "positive-income population" of India: this is lower than India's adult population (the 15-year-andover population makes about 60-65% of total population since the 1950s), but is very close to India's labor force (the labor force consists of about 40-45% of total population since the 1950s). 8 The Pareto law is given by 1-F(y)=(k/y) a (where 1-F(y) is the fraction of the population with income above y, and k>0 and a>1 are the structural Pareto parameters). For a recent use of Pareto extrapolation techniques with similar tax return data, see Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) . See also Atkinson (2004) and Dell (2004) . 9 Our average income series (see Banerjee and Piketty (2004, table A1, col.(7) )) was set to be equal to 70% of national income per tax unit (the 30% deduction is assumed to represent the fraction of national income that goes to undistributed profits, non-taxable income, etc.; the national income series was taken from Sivasubramonian (2000) , to whom we also borrowed our population series). We also report on table A0 other income aggregates based on GDP and NAS household consumption (both taken from the World Bank's WDI data base, from which we also extracted our CPI series, as well as the PPP exchange rate used on table 1) and on NSS household consumption (computed from Datt (1997 Datt ( , 1999 for the 1956 -1998 series and Deaton and Dreze (2002 for the corrected 1999-00/1993-4 growth rate). 10 In order to put these numbers in global perspective, one can note that India's 1999-2000 P99.99 threshold (about 160,000$ in PPP terms) is located midway in between U.S. 1998 P95 and P99 thresholds for 1998 (resp. 107,000$ and 230,000$; see Piketty and Saez (2003, 14 11 In the same way as for other countries (see above for references), we checked that our extrapolation results are virtually unaffected by the choice of extrapolation thresholds used to estimate the strutural parameters. Pareto coefficients are locally very stable in India, just like in other countries. Prior to the 1990s, the fraction of individuals subject to tax was less than 1%, and we used the lowest threshold available in order to estimate the top percentile threshold P99 (given that Pareto coefficients are in practice very stable, the resulting estimates apear to be as precise as estimates for thresholds P99,5 and above). 12 Or on stratified samples with sampling rates close to 100% for top incomes. 13 According to the tax administration statistics division, the sampling rate is about 1% and approximately uniform (no precise information about sampling design and rate is included in AIITS publications). Given India's large population, this implies that our estimate for the top 1% income share (8,95% of total income in 1999-00, see Banerjee and Piketty (2004 ,Table A4 ))) has a standard error of about 0,04%, and that our estimate for the top 0,01% income share (1,57% of total income in 1999-00, see Banerjee and Piketty (2004 , Table A4 )) has a standard error of about 0,08%. There is some evidence however that the sampling design is changing and that published tabulations are becoming more volatile by the end of the period. In particular, the tabulations for IY 1997 -8 (AIITS 1998 contain far too many individual taxpayers above 1 million Rs, thereby suggesting that something went wrong in the sampling design during that year .The 1997-8 estimates were corrected downwards on the basis of 1996-7 and 1998-9 tabulations. 14 Published wage tabulations for IY 1996-7 and 1997-8 appear to suffer from sampling design failures (top wages are clearly truncated in 1996-7, and they are too numerous in 1997-8), and our estimates for those two years were corrected on the basis of 1995-6 and 1998-9 data.
The long run dynamics of top income shares, 1922-2000
Figure 2 The fact that the turning point is so early makes it hard to attribute it to the formal process of liberalization. Indeed given the nature of our data, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the driving factor was either a shift in the global economic environment, or even that it was a part of the natural evolution of a mixed economy. However, the timing of the turn-around is also consistent with the view that there was a structural shift in the Indian economy in the early to mid 1980s. Delong (2002) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) , based on macro time series data, dates the acceleration in the growth rate of the Indian economy to the early to mid 1980s, rather than the early 1990s.
They suggest that this may have to do with a shift of power within the ruling Congress
Party towards a more technocratic/pro-business group associated with Rajiv Gandhi, who enters politics in 1981 following his brother's death, and become Prime Minister in 1984.
Available macro series also show that the wage share in the private corporate sector has been declining in India since the early to mid 1980s (in contrast to the 1970s, when the profit share was declining), 15 which is again consistent with our turning point.
Also while the turn-around was earlier, the data suggests a definite acceleration in the growth of the share of the top 0.01% after 1991. Figure 7 ) and Tendulkar (2003 , Table 14) . 16 Note that unlike in France, the U.S. or the U.K., top income shares were actually rising in India during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Top Indian nominal incomes do decline during the the 1930s, but less rapidly than the national income and wage series computed by Sivasubramonian (2000) . This probably reflects the fact that India had a very different position than France, the U.S. or the U.K. in the world division of labor during the 1930s (Indian entrepreneurs might have benefited from the drop in world manufacturing output and raw prices). 17 Unfortunately AIITS publications do not provide a complete set of tabulations broken down by income sources, so we were not able to study the point in greater detail.
(the pattern in most other European countries is quite similar). 18 The share of the very rich in Indian incomes is currently much higher than in Europe. As we show below, the rise of top Indian incomes during the recent period was not due to the revival of top capital incomes (the rise of top wages did play a key role, like in the U.S.). Although our data does not allow us to identify precisely the causal channels at work, and in particular to isolate the impact of globalization, we note that the fact that the rise in income inequality was so much concentrated within top incomes seems more consistent with a theory based on rents and market frictions (see e.g. Banerjee and Newman (2003)) than with a theory based solely on skills and technological complementarity (i.e. inequality rises in the South because low-skill southern workers are too low-skill to benefit from globalization; see e.g. Kremer and Maskin (2003)).
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Measurement issues
Our presumption so far has been that what we have measured is the actual income share of the rich. There are a number of reasons why this may not be true. First, despite our best efforts, we were unable to discover the exact changes that occured during the 1990s in the procedure for generating the samples used to create the tax tables. Our sense, from informal conversations with Indian tax officials, is that, at least in recent years, the procedure is more an informal attempt to sample randomly than a precise random sample. To the extent that this increases the risk of the data being clustered, the implication is that the within sample variance might overstate the precision of our data.
While this remains a possibility, we take some consolation from the fact that the trends, for the most part, seem quite stable. While our results for single years or sets of years may reflect sampling variation, the fact that in every year between 1973-74 and 1992-93, the share of the top 0.01% was less than 0.85% (and in every year but two it was less than 0.7%) and that in every year including and after 1995-96 it was greater than 1.5%, seems much more robust. Moreover the intervening two years, 1993-94 and 1994-95 do show, as we might have hoped for, shares for the top 0.01% that were between 0.7% and 1.5%.
A more serious problem is that the surge in top incomes may reflect improvements in the income tax department's ability to measure (and hence tax) the incomes of the wealthy.
One reason for this may be that tax cuts in the early 1990s, simply reduced the incentives for evading taxes among the wealthy. Note however that the overall decline in the top marginal rate, though non-monotonic, was quite moderate: the top marginal tax rate Of course, the effect of tax changes in India could have been reinforced by an spectacular improvements in the collection technology (and not only by increased incentives on the taxpayer side). There were, after all, a number of innovations in tax collection in the 1990s, such as the introduction of the "one in six rule" (in 1998) that required everyone who satisfied at least one out of six criteria (owning a car, travel abroad, etc.) to file a tax return.
To further investigate this issue, we redid the exercise above exclusively for wages.
Wages are clearly much less subject to tax evasion than non-wage incomes, since taxes are typically deducted at source and the employer has a strong incentive to report what he pays, since he gets to deduct the wages from his own taxes. Therefore if all that was happening was better collection, we would expect wage incomes to grow much more slowly than other incomes. To see if this is the case, we compare the evolution of top wages (see table 4 below) and with the evolution of top incomes (see table 2). We find that top wages have increased essentially in step with top incomes during the 1990s. In fact, wage growth among the top percentile of the wage distribution rose by 81% between 1987-8 and 1999-00, while the corresponding figure was 71% for the top percentile of the income distribution. This is consistent with the fact that the share of wages within the total income of the top percentile has increased somewhat during this period (from 28% to 31%). Although very top incomes are still mostly made of non-wage income, the wage part has increased during the 1990s.
Note that the view that there was "real" increase in top incomes (and especially top wages) in India during the 1990s is also consistent with the evolution of the public sector salary scale. Following a succession of Pay Commissions, including the well-known Fifth Pay Commission, whose recommendations were implemented in 1997, the salaries of Central Government employees were raised sharply in India during the 1990s.
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According to our computations (based upon published public sector salary scales), the Fifth Pay Commission alone can account for a substantial part of the rise in the number of top income taxpayers in India between 1994 and 1997. Central Government employees made about 7% of all income tax taxpayers in India in 1994 (less than 500,000 Central Government taxpayers, out of total of about 7 millions taxpayers), and they made almost 30% of all taxpayers by 1997 (about 3.2 millions Central Government taxpayers, out of a total of 11 millions). According to these computations, out of the 4 millions extra taxpayers recorded between 1994 and 1997, around 2.7 millions (almost 70%) were Central Government employees. The very top wage of the Central Government salary scale was 98,000 Rs (9,000 Rs par month) in 1994 (which was just a little bit above the P99,5 threshold), and it was raised up to 360,000 Rs (30,000 Rs per month) in 1997 (which was well above the P99,9 threshold). 23 However it does not seem to be that public sector wage increases were the primary driver behind the increase in inequality in the 1990s.
Most of the rise in top Indian income shares actually took place before 1997, and it is likely that the revised scale put forward by the Fifth Commission was itself a response to the large rise in top private sector wages that had taken place in previous years. , 1997) . In 1994, the Central Government scale ranked from scale 1 (9,000 Rs/month) to scale 62 (750 Rs/month), and all employees in scales 1 to 46 (approximately 500,000 employees) were subject to tax (i.e. had annual incomes over 28,000 Rs, which was the base exemption level in 1994, excluding all special deductions). In 1997, the (revised) scale ranked from scale S-34 (30,000 Rs/month, previously scale 1) to scale S-1 (2,550Rs/month, previously scale 62), and all employees in (revised) scales S-34 to S-3 (i.e. approximately 3.2 millions employees) were subject to tax (i.e. had annual incomes over 40,000 Rs, which was the base exemption level in 1997, excluding all special deductions). Note that these numbers only include Central Government employees strictly speaking, and that they would need to be scaled up substantially in order to take other Governement employees into account. In 1994, there were about 4 millions Central Government employees, and the total number of workers employed by State Governments, Quasi Government bodies and local bodies was about 3.5 times as large. In principle the Fifth Pay Commission revised scales also applied to these non-Central Governement employees. Unfortunately we were unable to find the salary distribution for these employees (such a document apparently only exists for the Central Government). 24 Such a view would be consistent with the fact the ceiling on private sector executive compensation was repealed as early as 1991.
The growth paradox of the 1990s
Can the fact that the rich were getting richer help solve what has been called the Indian growth paradox of the 1990s? Table 2 because there were large rounds of the NSS surveys in those years, which makes our estimates of the NSS-NAS gap more precise. 25 To eliminate the effect of using different deflators, we first compare nominal growth performance, and then compute real growth performance by using the same deflator for all the series (namely, the CPI).
Insert Table 2 raises the possibility that the very large growth of top incomes during the 1990s might help solve this puzzle. The average income growth among the top percentile of the tax units was 71% in real terms between 1987-8 and 1999-2000, which is substantially more than average growth according to the national accounts. Moreover, the higher one 25 Intermediate NSS surveys were conducted between the two large surveys of 1987-8 and 1993-4 and between the two large surveys of 1993-4 and 1999-2000 but these were based on smaller samples, and are generally considered as less reliable. Note that we used the 1999-00 per capita consumption estimates reported by Deaton and Dreze (2002) , who implement a procedure for correcting the data for changes in the recall period (all surveys until 1993-4 were conducted with a 30-day recall period, but he NSS has experienced with 7-day recall periods since then). 26 See the references above. Real growth during the 1990s would be somewhat higher if one was to use the GDP deflator instead of the CPI, but the NSS-NAS gap would obviously not change.
goes within the top percentile, the higher the growth (up to +285% for the top 0,01% income fractile).
What fraction of the NSS-NAS gap can be explained by the huge growth performance of very top incomes? Let us assume that the NSS is unable to record any of the extra growth enjoyed by the top percentile (say the people in the top percentile do not report their extra growth to the NSS, or do not report anything at all). According to our calculations, the top percentile share in total consumption was around 8% in 1987-8. 27 Since the average income of the top percentile increased by 71% in real terms between 1987-8 and 1999-2000 1980s-1990s: 1999-2000 vs 1981-1982 Insert 
Conclusion
Our results suggest that the gradual liberalization of the Indian economy did make it possible for the rich (the top 1%) to substantially increase their share of total income.
However, while in the 1980s the gains were shared by everyone in the top percentile, in the 1990s it was only those in the top 0.1% who big gains. The 1990s was also the period when the economy was opened. This suggests the possibility that the ultra-rich were able to corner most of the income gains in the 1990s because they alone were in a position to sell what the world markets wanted. 30 It would interesting to see whether in the coming years, as more and more people position themselves to benefit from the world markets, the share of the rich and the ultra-rich stops growing and even shrinks. For this and other reasons, we hope that this study would launch a trend towards more research (and better data) that focuses on the rich. 1. This is in a sense a lower bound, since we are using the 1987-8 top percentile share as our baseline for this computation, and the share was higher for later years. 30 The point is that one does not have to be rich on a global scale to be counted among the rich in India and even among the ultra-rich (See Source: Authors' computations using tax return data (Banerjee-Piketty (2004 , Table A1 and Table A2 , row 1999-00)).. Amounts in $ have been computed by applying the average 1999-2000 market exchange rate (that is, 1$=43,06Rs) and the average 1999-2000 PPP conversion factor (that is, 1$=8,65Rs) to amounts in current 1999-2000 Rs.
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1999-00 vs 1987-8
(nominal growth) (real growth)
Household consumption/capita (NSS) +242% +19%
GDP/capita (NAS) +337% +52%
Household consumption/capita (NAS) +304% +40%
National income/tax unit (NAS) +346% +55%
Top income fractile P99-100 (tax returns) +392% +71%
Top income fractile P99,5-100 (tax returns) +412% +78%
Top income fractile P99,9-100 (tax returns) +548% +125%
Top income fractile P99,99-100 (tax returns) +1009% +285%
Top income fractile P99-99,5 (tax returns) +331% +50%
Top income fractile P99,5-99,9 (tax returns) +317% +45%
Top income fractile P99,9-99,99 (tax returns) +393% +71%
Consumer price index +188%
20,1%
17,2%
12,7% 8,0%
Source: Authors' computations using tax return, NAS and NSS data (see Banerjee-Piketty (2004 , Table A1, Table  A2 and Table A3 , row 1999-00/1987-8))
Share of growth gap accounted for by P99,99-100 Household consumption/capita (NSS) +487% +25%
GDP/capita (NAS) +700% +70%
Household consumption/capita (NAS) +599% +49%
National income/tax unit (NAS) +688% +68%
Top income fractile P99-100 (tax returns) +1508% +242%
Top income fractile P99,5-100 (tax returns) +1747% +293%
Top income fractile P99,9-100 (tax returns) +2270% +404%
Top income fractile P99,99-100 (tax returns) +3980% +767%
Top income fractile P99-99,5 (tax returns) +992% +132%
Top income fractile P99,5-99,9 (tax returns) +1392% +217%
Top income fractile P99,9-99,99 (tax returns) +1698% +282%
Consumer price index +370%
39,7%
33,5%
19,1%
9,3%
Source: Authors' computations using tax return, NAS and NSS data (see Banerjee-Piketty (2004 , Table A1, Table  A2 and Table A3 , row 1999-00/1981-2))
Share of growth gap accounted for by P99,99-100 Household consumption/capita (NSS) +242% +19%
Top wage fractile P99-100 (tax returns) +420% +81%
Top wage fractile P99,5-100 (tax returns) +492% +105%
Top wage fractile P99,9-100 (tax returns) +551% +126%
Top wage fractile P99,99-100 (tax returns) +955% +266%
Top wage fractile P99-99,5 (tax returns) +246% +20%
Top wage fractile P99,5-99,9 (tax returns) +470% +98%
Top wage fractile P99,9-99,99 (tax returns) +448% +94%
Consumer price index +188% Source: Authors' computations using tax return, NAS and NSS data (see Banerjee-Piketty (2004 , Table A1, Table  A5 and Table A6, row 1999-00/1987-8)) 03/08/2004 4,0% 1922-3 1927-8 1932-3 1937-8 1942-3 1947-8 1952-3 1957-8 1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977-8 1982-3 1987-8 1992-3 1997-8 Source: Authors' computations using tax returns data (see Banerjee-Piketty (2004, Table A1, 3,5% 1922-3 1927-8 1932-3 1937-8 1942-3 1947-8 1952-3 1957-8 1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977-8 1982-3 1987-8 1992-3 1997-8 Source: Authors' computations using tax return data (see Banerjee-Piketty (2004, Table A4, 6,0%
7,0%
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